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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to reconcile culture with a theory of
rational choice. First, an examination of Mayan and Miskito
Indian cultures is given with reference to Craig Jackson
Calhoun's argument that traditional communities are more
readily mobilized into collective action than nontraditional communities. Second, an overview of the
"political" and "moral" economy approaches to rationality
illustrates why these frameworks are incapable of explaining
the Miskito and Mayan Indian behaviors examined in part one.
Finally, the evaluation exposes the need to develop a third,
"culturally inclusive" explanation of rational behavior that
is capable of accounting for distinctive sociocultural
factors functioning within a given community. A crosscultural and transnational model of rational choice should
not consider rationality as static or monomorphic, but
instead, as relative to the social system at hand. The
paper concludes by offering the foundation for a theoretical
approach to rational choice that avoids the pitfall of
cultural universalism, instead considering rationality as
relative.

HOW CULTURE SHAPES RATIONALITY:
STUDY OF MAYAN AND MISKITO COMMUNITIES
IN GUATEMALA AND NICARAGUA

Introduction

Peasants make up almost 35 percent of the world's
population and live in nearly all of the world's nations.1
It would seem, therefore, that peasant behavior —
economic and political —

social,

should be considered a meaningful

and influential area of investigation for all fields of
social science, academic and policy-oriented alike.

The

many attempts and failures at "democratization" during the
past fifteen years2 have demonstrated the importance of
addressing the ambitions and rationalities of the peoples
and communities that constitute a substantial and vital
portion of the world's inhabits —

the peasants.3

North American involvement in the Korean and Vietnam
Wars brought about unprecedented interest among social

1 See Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1966), pp. 1-17.
2Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp.
3-31, 280-315.
Anthropologists and other social scientists interested in
"peasant studies" have manufactured quite an extensive debate on
the meaning of the word "peasant" and who qualifies to be labeled
as such.
This paper does not tap into that polemic.
For the
purpose of arguments here, I define peasants as individuals with
little or no formal education, who participate in subsistence
agriculture, primarily as laborers and occasionally as petty
landowners.
2

3

scientists in addressing peasant behavior in order to better
understand the "enemy” and his motivation in opposing U.S.
Democracy.

Within political science, this interest

developed into a debate over the explanatory power of
"political” and "moral" economists, perhaps best represented
by authors Samuel Popkin and James Scott, respectively.
In his influential book, The Moral Economy of the
Peasant. Scott has argued that peasants plan their lives to
be "risk free" by striving only to maintain rudimentary
subsistence levels rather than to raise their incomes and
improve living standards.

Conversely, in The Political

Economy of the Peasant. Samuel Popkin has asserted that
peasants indeed do take risks, venturing to improve living
standards and raise subsistence levels through both longand short-term investments.
In this thesis paper I have chosen not to take the
tempting "middle ground" between the two theorists by
attempting to converge their ideas into a single, more
comprehensive view of peasant behavior.
using the authors' debate —
intervention —

Instead, I propose

and specifically Popkin's

as a point of departure into an area I find

both crucial to understanding peasant motivation in
collective action and relatively unexplored by political
scientists: the role of culture in determining political
behavior within peasant communities.
Whereas Popkin has argued that economic factors are the
force driving peasant behavior, I will argue that commitment
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to traditional culture within certain peasant communities is
equally important —

and in fact more influential —

in

determining both individual and collective behavior.

It is

not my intention to oppose Popkin's theory entirely, because
I believe that peasants are indeed rational actors.

I

argue, however, that understanding peasant behavior is not
an easily generalizable task, as Popkin implies, but a
complex one which must account for specific cultural
influences functioning within individual communities.

I

attempt to show, then, that rationality is not "given for
all time, but endogenous to the social system at hand."4
This paper is an attempt to reconcile cultural and
traditional influences with a model of rational behavior
determined at the individual level.

I argue that by

eliminating cultural influences and relying solely on
"economic rationality" or economic self-interest, as Popkin
has done, we cannot provide an adequate explanation of
traditional peasant behavior.

Only by accepting that

rationality is influenced and constrained by sociocultural
determinants, in addition to economic ones, can we begin to
develop a cross-cultural model of rational behavior.
In his article, "The Radicalism of Tradition and the
Question of Class Struggle,"5 Craig Jackson Calhoun argues

4Andrew Levine and Erik Olin Wright, "Rationality and Class
Struggle," New Left Review 123 (1980): 47-68.
5Craig Jackson Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition and the
Question of Class Struggle," in Rationality and Revolution, ed.
Michael Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.

in support of theoretical stance that I believe makes room
for the analysis of sociocultural factors in doctrines of
rational choice.

Calhoun closely follows the earlier work

of Ian Lustik, who asserted: "there is a pre-existing sense
of community among participants in collective revolutionary
action that makes it possible for organizers [both insiders
and outsiders] to appeal to the rationality of their
constituents as a basis for participation."6 " [A] strongly
knit social network," Calhoun adds, is "characteristic of
traditional communities and helps to explain their ability
to mobilize directly, instead of through the formal
organizations so important to the modern working class."7
In Chapter I of this paper, I discuss the four reasons
why —

in Calhoun's view —

direct mobilization is easier

for traditional than for non-traditional communities.

For

Calhoun, (1) the ability to identify common enemies, (2) a
tendency to be easily disrupted by outside intervention (3)
communal control of social life, and (4) "ideological unity"
serve to facilitate collective action within peasant
communities.

I proceed by examining a variety of empirical

evidence (from Indian testimonials, anthropological case
studies, and social science fieldwork) in order to
demonstrate how Calhoun's framework might be
129-75.
6Ian S. Lustik, "Writing the Intifada," World Politics 45 (July
1993): 589.
7Calhoun, "Radicalism of Tradition," p. 153.

operationalized.
In Chapter II, I give an overview of the moral
economist-political economist debate and demonstrate why
Samuel Popkin's "economic” explanation of peasant behavior
and peasant rationality cannot explain the significance of
Calhoun's view or its implications on the broader question
of collective action and mobilization.

I offer evidence of

peasant behavior that does not and cannot fit into existing
moral or political economy frameworks.

The validity of the

testimonial evidence and field studies I present is clearly
not a question to be answered, or even addressed, in this
paper.

I want instead to illustrate that we must consider a

third possibility —
influences —

one which accounts for cultural

and to test it empirically in future studies.

Finally, in Section IV, I explain why Popkin's theory
falls short on explanatory power and return to the task of
reconciling culture with rational behavior.

Here I lay the

groundwork for a conception of rationality that does
consider specific cultural and traditional influences on
peasant behavior and conclude with an explanation of why
such a view is necessary to understand traditional peasants
and their actions.

Chapter I;
What factors facilitate collective action within the
traditional community?

In his article dealing with the significance of
tradition in the popular mobilization of social, peasant
communities, Craig Calhoun points to four ways in which
traditional social foundations can facilitate and expedite
mobilization or other collective action of community
members.
First, Calhoun argues, members of traditional
communities find it "relatively easy" to identify collective
enemies.

Elites or other community members who choose to

set themselves apart from traditional communities thereby
label themselves as outsiders and become potential enemies
to the greater community.

On the other hand, elites who

integrate themselves into local communities decrease the
likelihood that they will becomes victims of violent
insurrection.8
Second, Calhoun asserts, because traditional
communities are largely self-regulating, they are also
easily agitated by outside intervention.

Even the well

intentioned efforts of "do-gooders" trying to "improve" the

8Calhoun, "Radicalism of Tradition," p. 153.
7
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lives of peasant community members are viewed with mistrust,
hostility and as threats to communal interests and welfare.9
Traditional communities resent outsiders and constantly
strive to defend their autonomy and function without
interference from external influences.
Third, to the extent that a traditional community is
autonomous, with significant power and ability to control
the "labor process" of its members (e.g. maintaining crops,
selling food or crafts, or raising animals for market) it
can also control a considerable amount of members' social
lives.

Because they have enormous control over the social,

political and economic lives of their members, traditional
communities perceive themselves as being justly unchecked
from interference and exploitation by elites.

Elite

intervention only disrupts the normal functions and customs
of the community and its members.
Fourth, traditional communities have the foundation for
"mobilization outside the purview of the intended targets of
collective action, a free 'social space.'"10 By extension,

9Catholic
intervention
into
Central
American
peasant
communities is a perfect example. While such intervention has at
times been well accepted by these communities, they were more often
met with (sometimes violent) rejection and refusal.
Even
communities which have adopted all or part of Catholicism did so
only after much conflict and controversy. See: Robert M. Carmack,
The Quiche Mavas of Utatl£n. The Evolution of a Highland Kingdom.
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), pp. 305-20, 332, 33541, 360, 364-365, 375. Or: James D. Sexton, ed., Son of Tectin Uman.
A Mava Indian Tells His Life Storv (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 1981), pp. 15, 25, 88, 139-40, 168, 213-14.
10Calhoun, "Radicalism of Tradition," p. 154.
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I believe Calhoun is arguing that there is at least a
foundation of ideological uniformity existing within
traditional communities that liberates them from "the need
to work through formal, non-communal organizations [in which
social] movements must always be exposed to ideological
counter attacks."11 A powerful and controlling sense of
common identity shared by members of traditional, peasant
communities has both pragmatic and intangible implications.
In other words, the shared identity provides community
members with specific roles to play or functions to fulfill
as well as a sense of belonging a distinct
ethnic/religious/linguistic group and knowing one's place
within the community.

The following segment will elucidate

these four assertions with illustrations of traditional
peasant behavior and attitudes.
Empirical evidence: Studies of traditional communities in
Central America: The Mavan and Miskito Indians
Perhaps the most famous Indian from contemporary
Guatemala is Rigoberta Menchti, a young woman who won a Nobel
Peace Prize in 1993 for her autobiographical testimony, Me
Llamo Riaoberta MenchU y as1 me nacio la conciencia.12 In
the introduction of her intimate autobiography, which
includes both personal experiences and detailed descriptions

nIbid.
12Rigoberta Menchu, Me Llamo Riaoberta MenchCi v asl me nacio la
conciencia. Elizabeth Burgos, ed. (Barcelona: Argos Vergara, S.A.,
1983) . Translated edition: Riaoberta Menchti. an Indian Woman in
Guatemala, trans. Ann Wright (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1984).
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of her community's cultural activities and traditions,
Menchti writes, "I'd like to stress that [this is] not only
my life, it's also the testimony of my people....The
important thing is that what has happened to me happened to
many other people too: My story is the story of all poor
Guatemalans.

My personal experience is the reality of a

whole people."13
MenchCi illustrates both Calhoun's four points and the
broader goal of this thesis: to show that rationality is not
solely based on economic self-interest but also on the
cultural and traditional forces functioning within each
distinct community.

I begin by drawing out her confirmation

of Calhoun's argument and conclude with support for my own.
Calhoun's first point is that traditional communities
can readily identify their common enemies.

Michael Taylor

confirms: "Part of the cohesion of the rural community [is]

13MenchCi, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 1. I view Rigoberta
Menchu's testimony as a very powerful and representative
description of Guatemalan Indian life. This view has been affirmed
by anthropologists and cultural sociologists who focus their
attention on the rich and extremely complex mosaic that is
Guatemalan society.
John Beverley and Marc Zimmerman write:
"...[T]he specific structure of socioeconomic dependency in Central
America...positions
literature
as
a
crucial
ideological
practice....[P]articularly in situations of large-scale political
mobilization like revolutionary movements, the unity of a class or
people is fundamentally a symbolic unity constructed in discursive
practices." Given the illiteracy and lack of institutionalization
of literature at both national and regional levels within
Guatemala, Rigoberta has taken it upon herself (and taught herself
Spanish) to become a voice of protest against the social, economic
and political injustice suffered by her community and her people as
a whole.
See Beverley and Zimmerman, Literature and Politics in
the Central American Revolutions. (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1990), p. x.
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derived...from the shared opposition of its members toward
the lords, whose depredations engender...among peasants a
defensive unity that [can] overc[o]me their internal
differences.1,14 By revealing the meaning of "enemy" in her
community, how that meaning evolved and why it is important
for her people to recognize groups and individuals hostile
to her race and culture, MenchCi amplifies Calhoun's claims
and illustrates the desire for communal autonomy.

In the

following passage, she explains the construction of the
"insider versus outsider," or "us versus them" mentality:
We began to understand that the root of all our
problems was exploitation. That there were rich
and poor and that the rich exploited the poor —
our sweat, our labor. That's how they got richer
and richer . The fact that we were always... bowing
to the authorities was part of the discrimination
we Indians suffered. So was the cultural
oppression which tries to divide us by taking away
our traditions....15
According to Menchu, therefore, enemies were defined as
those who capitalized on the poverty, hunger and suffering
of Indians and who worked to maintain their power advantage
over indigenous peoples by keeping them poor and
unorganized.

She continues:

The moment I lerned (sic) to identify our enemies
was very important for me. For me now the
landowner was a big enemy, an evil one. The
soldier too was a criminal enemy. And so were all
the rich. We began using the term "enemies"
because we didn't have the notion of enemy in our

14Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture and Action in the
Explanation of Social Change," Politics & Society Vol. 17, No 2
(June 1989): 125.
15Menchu, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 118.
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culture, until those people arrived to exploit us
and discriminate against us.... The ladinos16
behave like a superior race. Apparently there was
a time when the ladinos used to think we were not
people at all, but some sort of animal. All this
became clear to me.17
After recognizing personally that the suffering of her
people was not their destiny and that they did not have to
wait a lifetime to finally have a "decent” life in heaven,18
Menchti felt the need to share her ideas with others.

It is

clear from Menchti's description of her work, that
identifying "enemies" was not the difficult task for her
people, fighting them was.

The author recounts the words of

her community's elders:
Who is to blame for [Indian suffering]? The White
Man who came to our country. We must not trust
them, white men are all thieves. We must keep our
16In the context of Rigoberta Menchu7s testimony ladino
signifies: "[A]ny Guatemalan, whatever his economic position, who
rejects, either individually or through his cultural heritage,
Indian values of Mayan origin. It also implies mixed blood."
See: Menchti, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 249.
17Ibid. , pp. 124-25.
18Menchu acknowledges that she is a Christian and that she has
been influenced by Catholic Action's activities in her community,
as well as by priests and nuns she encountered in other regions of
Guatemala. For her, Catholicism is not so much a religion as it is
a "form of expression." She emphasizes that believing in Christ is
in no way a betrayal of her culture because she and her people have
accepted Catholicism only to the extent that it is in harmony with
traditional religious beliefs.
(For example, both religions
profess that there is only one God.)
She therefore rejects the
labeling of her community as polytheistic.
Menchu's religious beliefs and therefore, her statements, are
notably influenced by "liberation theology." (For example, the
notion that the destiny of her people is not to suffer indefinitely
in this life.)
Despite frequent references to the tenets of
liberation
theology,
however,
the
author
never
directly
acknowledges any allegiance with or belief in that school of
thought.
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secrets from them.19
Therefore, in MenchCi's eyes, Indians did not need to be
told where the social, political and cultural oppression
originated in their country.

Instead, they were interested

in developing mechanisms for protecting themselves and
preserving
of

their way of life.

She describes the development

her own awareness of the Indian situation in Guatemala:
...[W]hen you see your own reality, a hatred grows
inside you for those oppressors that make the
people suffer so.... [I]t is not fate which makes
us poor. It's not because we don't work, as the
rich say. They say: 'Indians are poor because
they're always asleep.' But I know from
experience that we're outside ready for work at
three in the morning. It was this that made us
decide to fight. This is what motivated me and
many others.... I knew that teaching others how to
defend themselves against the enemy was a
commitment I had to make — a commitment to my
people and my commitment as a Christian.20
MenchCi's work to improve the lives of her people,

therefore, began with two primary components.

First, the

indigenous population recognized their "common enemy" as the
exploiters and oppressors of their labor and culture.
Second, as Menchu explains, Indian communities had to decide
what it was, exactly, for which they wanted to fight.

She

concludes her story with unwavering belief in her cause:
We all contribute in different ways, but we are
working for the same objective.... [I]t wasn't
born out of something good, it was born out of
wretchedness and bitterness. It has been
radicalized by the poverty in which my people
live. It has been radicalized by the malnutrition

19Ibid, p. 69.
20Ibid. , pp. 133-41.
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which I, as an Indian, have seen and experienced.
And by the exploitation and discrimination which
I've felt in the flesh. And by the oppression
which prevents us performing our ceremonies, and
shows no respect for our way of life, the way we
are.... [M]y commitment to our struggle knows no
boundaries.21
Menchti's words make clear that the objects of her
community's struggle included not only political, social and
economic rights for the impoverished indigenous population,
but cultural rights as well.

Recognition and respect of

cultural beliefs and traditions constitute a vital part of
the struggle in Rigoberta's community and in other
indigenous populations in Central America.
Menchd's testimony also provides support for Calhoun's
second claim, that traditional communities are easily
disrupted by any outside intervention, including that of
"do-gooders.”

During her description of communal wedding

ceremonies, she comments:
[The community members] insist that they don't
desire what the rich have. We have hands to make
our pottery with and we don't want to lose the
skill. They say: 'These things may be modern but
we mustn't buy the rubbish they [ladinos] have,
even if we have the money. We must keep our ways
of making our own.' Our village does not have a
grinder for our maize. This is not because we
could not get one. Many landowners would gladly
install one to grind the maize for the whole
village. But our people say no. The ladinos
bring their machines in little by little and soon
they own everything.22
Menchu insists that community members view traditional ways

21Ibid. , pp. 246-47.
22Ibid. , p. 72.
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as superior to "modern” ways of living, simply because they
are culturally significant.

In her words, "Generations and

generations will pass but we will always be Indians.

It is

our duty...to keep our secrets safe generation after
generation, to prevent the ladinos from learning anything of
our ancestors' ways."23 This example is especially
important because maize (or corn) is sacred in the
traditional Maya-Quich4 religion, which identifies the
Indians as "men of maize."24 Planting, tending, harvesting
and grinding corn are all sacred activities within the Maya
Quiche culture.

To give up or alter even one step of the

corn-growing process would, therefore, mean departing from
ancient ways and breaking with sacred tradition.
Maintaining their antiquated farming and cooking techniques
is an important aspect of Maya Quiche life, not because the
traditions are efficient or economical, but because they
have cultural meaning and affirm solidarity with communal
ancestors.
In addition to the inherent hostility existing between
unequals in a social hierarchy which may prevent cooperation
among members of different classes, Menchu makes it clear

23Menchu, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, pp. 67-8.
24The Pooul Vuh. Sacred Book of the Ancient Quiche Mava.
explains that the first four humans were created out of a corn
paste. Corn was the plant most venerated by the ancient Maya
Indians.
See Adrian Recinos, Po p u I Vuh. The Sacred Book of the
Ancient Quiche Mava. trans. Delia Goetz and Sylvanus G. Morley
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950), p. 62.
Also see
Miguel Angel Asturias, Men of Maize. (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Losada, 1949).
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that her community refuses to "modernize" its equipment
simply because it would necessitate deviation from ancestral
customs and rituals.

While acknowledging that resistance to

modern technology can mean an often "primitive" lifestyle,
the community repudiates "modernization" in the sense that
it would require departure from traditional cultural
practices.
In his book about the Maya-Quiche Indians living in the
Utalan, Robert Carmack describes an example of Indian
behavior which provides additional support for the second
tenet of Calhoun's argument.

He explains:

In the hands of Spanish priests who administered
in the Quiche area, Catholic Action launched a
direct assault on traditional Quiche religion.
Every community experienced a holy war of sorts
between the catequistas (progressives) and the
costumbristas (traditionalists). Violence erupted
often, especially in the 1950's. At Santa Cruz
the priests managed to eradicate the burning of
candles to the ancestors in the church, but when
they tried to take the Buried Jesus Saint from the
control of the cofriadas,25 a struggle ensued.
Several converts to Catholic Action were thrown in
jail and the traditionalists even tried
unsuccessfully to have the priest removed from his
post.... Later the priest tried to abolish the
cofriada ritual and other "customs" practiced in
the church. The traditionalists rose up in arms
and attacked the convent. The priest barely
escaped with his life and returned later with an
armed guard. The traditionalists were too
powerful to be blocked in Chichicastenago, and to
the present day the priests do not interfere with
them.26

25Carmack describes cofriadas as eight religious cults that
play a significant role in Quiche-Maya religious rituals.
26Carmack, The Ouiche-Mava of Utalan. p. 361.
Gruhn, R.; "Observations in Chichicastenago
Estudias de Cultura Mava 9 (1973): 247-48.

in

1969,"
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Carmack's account provides an excellent example of peasant
resistance to interference into their communities.

What is

particularly relevant in this case is the fact that the
intervention into the community was by priests, or "dogooders” who presumably sought to better the lives (and
afterlives1) of the village members.
In his book Mv Car in Managua. Forrest Colburn provides
an equally powerful illustration of peasant resistance to
intervention into communal life, regardless of the
charitable motivations of the interfering organization.
Here, Colburn describes the effect of socialist intervention
into the Nicaraguan Corn Islands (home to primarily Miskito
Indians) after the fall of Somoza in 1979:
The Somozas ignored the Atlantic Coast and it
ignored them.... Although there was no fighting
anywhere on the Atlantic side during the
Sandinistas' insurrection, their 1979 victory had
immediate consequences for the Corn Islands.... As
the regime consolidated its power, it announced
that it would seek broader-based economic growth
on the Atlantic Coast, and would try to mesh the
hitherto "marginalized” territory into the nation
as a whole. Unhappily, in practice, both the
efforts to promote equitable development and the
moves toward integration have disrupted the
islanders' way of life.... Perhaps the greatest
potential importance in these circumstances would
be a government promise to grant the entire
Atlantic Coast increased autonomy. Nothing would
please the inhabitants of the Corn Islands more.
An articulate young woman captured the essence of
the situation when she commented ironically, "The
Sandinistas want to liberate us, but we are too
independent to be liberated."27
According to Colburn, the Miskito Indians provide another

^Forrest D. Colburn Mv Car in Managua (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1991) pp. 87-97.
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example of a traditional, cultural community that resents
outside intervention into its affairs, however "benevolent”
the motives of the intervening party.

As Calhoun has

argued, maintenance of autonomy is one of the community's
foremost goals.
To promote Calhoun's third point —

that traditional

communities have tremendous control over the social lives
and social behavior of their members —

I again draw

examples from the Mayan and Miskito Indians living in
Central America.28
Rigoberta Menchti reinforces Calhoun's argument with
extensive descriptions of Maya-Quiche communal life and the
importance of adhering to cultural norms in order to be
accepted into the community at large.

For example, Menchu

explains her relationship with her parents by stating: "They
gave me the freedom to do what I wanted with my life as long
as, first and foremost, I obeyed the laws of our ancestors.
That's when they taught me not to abuse my own dignity— both

28I wish here to acknowledge the limitation of available
resources dealing with the Miskito Indians and their culture.
While I have found various sources to support Calhoun's third and
fourth points (and my own broader argument) I want to make known
that the majority of literature that even mentions the Miskitos
does so in reference to their political confrontations with the
Sandinistas after the fall of Somoza in 1979. The few detailed
accounts of Miskito communities that I have encountered appear (at
least to someone who has not been there first hand) at times
outdated and often culturally biased in favor of European/North
American heritage.
I believe, however, that while we must read
this data with knowledge of its era, it can provide both
interesting information and support for this thesis paper if we
"read between the lines."
This point will be more fully
illustrated in the remaining explanation of Calhoun's argument.

19

as a woman and a member of our race.”29 Menchti's comments
imply that within her community, cultural laws supersede
political and more general (ladino) social laws.

At very

least, she seeks to create a space in which her culture can
be preserved against the "predatorial," dominant culture.
Because, as Menchti reveals in the remainder of her
testimony, her Maya-Quiche ancestors had something to say
about practically every aspect of social life,30 obeying
their laws is no simple task, but instead, something which
requires conscious effort on a daily basis.

It then becomes

obvious to the reader that the "freedom" which Menchti
mentions, given the tremendous amount of ancestral custom
that one must follow, does not really allow for social
independence at all.31
Menchti intentionally acknowledges the social autonomy
of her community throughout her text, in my view, to draw
attention to the unique quality of the Maya-Quiche culture
and the importance of protecting its distinct customs,
religion, dress and language.

The rejection of "modern"

29Menchtt, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 59.
30For example, there is ancestral "law" dealing with family
relations; birth, marriage and death ceremonies; work, relationship
with the earth; proper treatment of elders, pregnant women,
parents, siblings and spouses; religion; celebrations, and gender
roles, just name a few of the topics that Ms. Menchti discusses in
her testimony.
31It is important to note that the author does not regard these
laws as limitations to her social freedom, but as meaningful,
sacred guidelines to help individuals and the greater community
structure a honorable life in accordance with a rich and
multifacetous cultural heritage.
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maize-grinders in favor of ancient ways of hand-grinding
principle foodstuffs is representative of a broader sense of
internal (or cultural) moral superiority.

In her discussion

of communal marriage ceremonies, Menchti remarks: The outside
world —

which we know is disgusting —

has set a bad

example and has started giving us pills and gadgets.... The
thing is, to us, using medicine to stop having children is
like killing your own children.

It's negating the laws of

our ancestors....1,32
Later in the discussion, Menchti reiterates the
importance of adhering to ancestral law:

[W]hen a couple

gets married in our community, they have to preserve our
traditions and act as an example for their brothers and
sisters and for their neighbors' children.

It's a very

important commitment for us."33 She recounts a similar
penalty for breaking with communal tradition: "In our
community, if a girl is seen in the street with a boy, she
both loses her dignity and breaks the customs of our
forefathers."34 In both of these examples, Menchti indicates
that breaking with traditional culture is synonymous with
becoming dishonorable in the eyes of the community.
Preserving tradition is tantamount to preserving life
itself; for the Maya-Quiche people, living without cultural

32Ibid. , p. 60. (My emphasis.)
33Ibid. , p. 62.
^Ibid., p. 63
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practice likens to nonexistence.
More often than not, the internal focus of Menchu's
community appears to be a defensive mechanism for protecting
its cultural autonomy and resisting acculturation into the
more politically and economically powerful ladino community.
She declares: ”[0]ur grandparents say of Coca-Cola: 'Never
let your children drink this dreadful stuff because it is
something which threatens our culture.V

They say: 'These

things are made by machines; our forefathers never used
machines.'”

And later on: ”We must

those of the Whites.

not mix our customs with

So we don't eat bread.

tortilla.... Don't let our children
bread; our ancestors had no bread.”

It is not our

get used to eating
It becomes obvious from

Menchti's testimony that there is indeed an enormous amount
of social control in her community, ranging, as we have
seen, from marriage protocol and courting etiquette to the
consumption of soft drinks.
An equally relevant portrayal of a traditional,
cultural community's social control over its inhabitants
exists among the Miskito Indians on the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua.

As I have briefly mentioned, information about

this group of people is limited and dated.

In contrast,

information about the Mayan Indians is plentiful.

Despite

these empirical shortcomings I have attempted to use the
information I have found to support both Calhoun's argument
and my own thesis.
The 1982 MISURASATA Charter of the United Nations for
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Indigenous Unity35, while clearly influenced by Sandinist
rhetoric, provides insight into the goals and values of the
Miskito Indians as well as the Sumu and Rama, two smaller
Indian groups living in Nicaragua.

The document states:

Our education should provide our children with a
knowledge of their own culture, so that they can
be proud of it and in this way strengthen their
ethnic identity.... The Sandinist State must
guarantee our indigenous people their right to
exist, to live in accordance with our customs and
to develop our cultures, since they constitute
specific ethnic identities — that is to say, the
right to maintain and develop our cultures,
languages and traditions. We do not want to
imitate foreign forms, but to be as we are.
Therefore, we strive that our Sandinist country be
a truly multi-ethnic state, in which each ethnic
group has the right of self-determination and a
free choice of social and cultural alternatives.36
These goals most obviously include protection of cultural
autonomy and tradition.

By extension, though, we can

understand these goals as also signifying a recognizable
value being placed upon the existence of enforceable social
norms within the Miskito communities.
In an entirely different sort of document, the
Smithsonian Institution's 1932 Ethnographic Survey of the

35MISURASATA stands for Miskito, Sumu, Rama and Sandinistas
United.
The organization represents a Nicaraguan indigenous
movement founded in November, 1979.
See National Revolution and
Indigenous Identity: The Conflict between Sandinists and Miskito
Indians on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. Klaudine Ohland and Robin
Schneider,
eds.
(Copenhagen:
International Work Group for
Indigenous Affairs, 1982), pp. 38-41, 48-63, 68-72, 89-94, 163-177,
203-217.
36"Lineamientos Generalesz 1982 Charter of the United Nations
for Indigenous Unity" National Revolution and Indigenous Identity,
the conflict between Sandinistas and Miskito Indians on Nicaragua's
Atlantic Coast pp. 48-64.
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Miskito and Sumu Indians of Honduras and Nicaragua.
adherence to social norms is also evident.

Despite the

\

ethnocentric and often racist tone of the survey, readers
are able to glean some notion of Miskito social life.

The

author's descriptions are at times condescending and clearly
skewed by his subjective interpretation of Miskito
lifestyle; nonetheless, he reveals that the community is
ruled —

like the more "modern” example of Menchti's

community —

with strict adherence to social norms.

Not

surprisingly, these norms deal with many of the same aspects
of life which I have discussed with respect to the Mayan
Indians: religion, marriage, sexuality, birth rites,
childrearing and death ceremonies.

The following passage

illustrates these norms while also providing a sense of the
content and tone of the author's work:
During the menstrual periods, "woman sickness,”
the woman is considered unclean and is shunned by
her husband. She must not touch any food intended
for other people, otherwise the latter might
die.... When the Miskito woman is inconvenienced
in the accustomed manner, she occupies a small
temporary hut built by her husband at a few
hundred yards from the settlement. She remains
there a couple of days.... While in this state of
impurity the woman must not be seen by a sukya,
[holy man] for that would weaken the latter's
connection with the spirits, and perhaps even
cause his death. At the conclusion of the third
day the woman bathes herself in a neighboring
creek and then rejoins her family. All cooking
vessels used by her during this period are broken
and thrown away.37

37Eduard Conzemius, Ethnographical Survey of the Miskito and
Sumu Indians of Honduras and Nicaragua: Smithsonian Institution
Bureau of American Ethnology. Bulletin 106 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1932), pp. 148-149.
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Clearly, the social behavior of Miskito women is not only
influenced by communal regulations, but dictated by them.
The author continues his description of Miskito life
with an account of a similarly restrictive and norm-based
behavior dealing with the death of a spouse :
Upon the death of his wife a man generally married
her sister; similarly, if a woman has lost her
husband, she was taken in marriage by her brotherin-law. For that reason, the names for stepfather
and father's brother are identical in most of the
dialects spoken on the Mosquito Coast. On the
other hand, the children of brother and sister are
not considered blood relatives, and a union
between such cousins is the common, and originally
perhaps, the only marriage allowed. Unions of
this kind are still encouraged to this day, for it
is felt that family ties are strengthened
thereby.38
While the peculiarities of these customs may have evolved
since the survey was written, the recent works of Forrest
Colburn, Klaudine Ohland and Robin Schneider provide
evidence that the substructure of communal influence on the
social behavior of Miskito Indians retains a substantial
amount of control over their lives.
Finally, Calhoun points to a fourth explanation of why
traditional cultural communities are more readily mobilized
into collective action than "modern" communities.

He

maintains that traditional communities have a foundation of
ideological unity that confers upon them the notion of a
"free social space."

In other words, community members

possess a common cultural identity which both results from

38Ibid., p. 146.
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and serves to protect the cultural distinctiveness and
autonomy of the group.

Menchti substantiates this claim with

a personal account of Indian conflicts with Guatemalan
government officials and her community's attempts at
political and physical self-defense.

While discussing the

development of the Comity Unidad Campesina (Committee for
Peasant Unity, or CUC) she defines the organization's goals:
"a fair wage from landowners; respect for our communities;
the decent treatment we deserve as people, not animals;
respect for our religion, our customs, our culture."39
Along with the political objectives of fair salaries and
adequate living conditions (goals not uncommon to an
oppressed people living in any state) Menchtl includes
recognition and consideration of her community's cultural
differences.

Political goals and cultural goals have become

inextricably fused.
By repeatedly using the terms "our" and "we," Menchu's
testimony confirms Calhoun's notion of the ideological unity
of traditional community.

She continues:

We can select what is truly relevant for our
people. Our lives show us what this is. It has
guaranteed our existence. Otherwise we would not
have survived. We have rejected all the aims
governments have tried to impose. It wasn't only
me who did this, of course. I'm saying we did it
together. Those are the conclusions my whole
community came to.... [W]e have hidden our
identity because we needed to resist, we wanted to
protect what governments have wanted to take away
from us. They have tried to take our things away
and impose others on us, be it through religion,

39Menchti, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 160.

(My emphasis.)
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through dividing up the land, through schools,
through books, through radio, through all things
modern. This is why we maintain the rites for our
ceremonies. And why we don't accept Catholic
Action as the only way to God, and why we don't
perform only Christian ceremonies. We don't want
to because we know that they are weapons to take
away what is ours.40
Similarly, in the MISURASATA Charter of the U.N. for
Indigenous Unity, the authors explain:
It is thought that if the Indio is to be liberated
socially, there must be an end to his being an
Indio; that is to say to crush his ethnic
specificity and naturally integrate him into the
national society. Certainly you may sometimes
hear about the need to preserve cultural values,
but these are empty words for nothing is done to
put them into practice. Certain dogmatic Marxists
also stubbornly ignore the question of ethnicity,
despite the empirical facts. The complexities of
inter-ethnic friction are squeezed into the narrow
mould of class struggle. What this type of
Marxism does not realize is that indigenous
populations are able to act from a political
consciousness that stems from an ethnic
consciousness.... Our fundamental right
should...be guaranteed that we can advance our own
means of cultural, linguistic, social, religious,
economic and political expression. "EVERY PEOPLE
HAS THE RIGHT TO WORK FOR THE TRIUMPH OF THEIR OWN
CULTURE. ”41
Both of these criticisms of cultural universalism and of
dominant groups' "ignorance” of distinct ethnic groups
endorse the notion that the Mayan and Miskito traditional
communities are, at least to some degree, united by their
common culture.

This is not to ignore the fact that

conflicts exist both within and among Indian communities;

40Ibid. , pp. 170-171.
41 "Charter of the United Nations for Indigenous Unity," pp.
60-3. (My emphasis; capitalization original.)
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instead, the passages set forth evidence that Indian
identity is primary for both groups.

Furthermore, the

"ethnic consciousness" to which the authors refer gives
credence to Calhoun's belief in the traditional community's
foundation of ideological solidarity.
I have illustrated in this section of the paper that
substantial evidence exists to support Calhoun's four
premises concerning the mobilization of traditional
communities.

If his thesis were accurate, the evidence

points to the conclusion that traditional communities are
indeed more readily mobilized into collective action than
non-traditional communities.

My objective here is to

establish that evidence indeed exists to uphold Calhoun's
proposal, and explicitly not to address the second half of
his argument.

I offer this paper as a theoretical critique

of political economy and not an empirical critique
concerning actual mobilization of traditional communities
into political action.
In the following section, I provide a detailed account
of Popkin's intervention into the moral economy versus
political economy debate.

The purpose of Chapter II is to

give the reader an overview of Popkin's position and thereby
reveal why his understanding of peasant rationality cannot
explain the behaviors and ideas which I have examined
through Calhoun's four points.

In Chapter III, I propose an

alternative theoretical conception of rationality to account
for these behaviors and ideas.

I conclude by supporting my
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proposal with empirical evidence.

Chapter II:
Moral Economy and Popkin's Counteraction

Because Popkin's reasoning in The Rational Peasant is
first and foremost a response to Scott's The Moral Economy
of the Peasant. I begin this analysis with an overview of
the "moral economy" approach and a summary of its principal
arguments.
A. Scott's View of Moral Economy
Moral economy maintains that peasant violence is a
solely defensive reaction against capitalism and an attempt
to preserve the pre-capitalist structures that insure
peasant welfare.42 In this view, resistance only
perpetuates a rigid social hierarchy and the primacy of the
dominant over the weak.

Scott claims that colonialism,

state formation and capitalism handicap peasant security by
increasing the social inequality and stratification that

42 James C. Scott argues that peasants will fight to maintain
or restore the pre-capitalist institutions that preserve the
communal "welfare system" on which they depend for survival. This
system, he claims, provides money, food, clothing, shelter and
health care for peasants lacking the resources to provide for their
own (or their family's) survival in economically difficult times.
These institutions also provide consistent protection from
starvation with collective insurance schemes— such as scatteredplot cultivation— which safeguard against the spoliation or
destruction of any one family's food supply. See: Scott, The Moral
Economy of the Peasant. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1976), pp. 13-55.
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force peasants into isolation, where they lack the insurance
and protection of their traditional cultural or village
institutions.
As a corollary to peasant distrust of unreliable
sources of income, moral economy holds that security is
paramount within peasant communities.

Because peasants are

consistently close to falling below the "danger line," or
minimal subsistence level,43 even minute drops in
production or income can trigger a disaster within the
peasant household.

Peasants strive to grow enough food for

themselves and their families; that is, the "safety first"
principle states that peasants are averse to financial risk
and focus on avoiding losses rather than maximizing profits
to improve living standards.
Scott argues that capitalist development within peasant
communities

thwarts theaim of their "moral economy" by

turning labor, food and land into merchandise, where
previously access to such commodities had been fundamental
"rights" due to all village members, regardless of economic
prosperity.

In other words, by including land and labor in

a competitive market, the substance of peasant society

43Scott writes: "While a minimum income has solid physiological
dimensions, we must not overlook its social and cultural
implications. In order to be a fully functioning member of village
society, a household needs a certain level of resources to
discharge its necessary ceremonial and social obligations as well
as to feed itself adequately and continue to cultivate. To fall
below this level is not only to risk starvation, it is too suffer
a
profound loss of standing within the community and perhaps to
fall into a permanent situation of dependence."
See Scott, The
Moral Economy of the Peasant, p. 9.
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becomes subordinate to the laws of that market and
eliminates the tendencies toward "leveling" and
"inclusiveness" that exist in the well-functioning moral
economy.
Another moral economist, Eric Wolf, notes that
"capitalism 'liberated' man as an economic agent, but the
concrete process of liberation entailed the accumulation of
human suffering against which anti-capitalist critics,
conservatives and radicals alike, [have] direct[ed] their
social and moral criticism,1,44 Moral economy views peasant
welfare as inversely related to commercial progress in a
capitalist market.

Because they provide the greatest

insurance of peasants' well-being, eradicating traditional
institutions generates tensions which can eventually erupt
into revolt and revolution.
Moral economists maintain that peasants' traditional
distaste for buying and selling in a market atmosphere
develops because of their subsistence lifestyle, which is
most cases, provides only enough food for an individual or
family's subsistence.

No food typically remains to be

marketed from peasants' harvest, and on the rare occasion
that it does,

surplus is likely to be shared with needy

extended family members or the village poor, as religious

^Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1969) p. 280.
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and cultural obligations dictate.45 Because surplus is
rare,46 preserving the "right to subsistence" through
cultural institutions like these is generally the peasant's
primary interest.

Such village organizations, moral

economist argue, are organized to insure subsistence for the
poorest villagers by making demands on "wealthier" ones when
it becomes economically necessary to do so.

In contrast to

this relative security of village institutions and communal
insurance schemes, capitalist markets provide only an
unpredictable, inconsistent means to satisfy subsistence
needs.

Therefore, according to moral economy, peasants turn

to organized, capitalist markets only when unable to satisfy
their subsistence needs and cultural obligations through

45 James C. Scott explains such behavior in a Malaysian village
in which he lived and studied: "Razak's family [example of an
extremely poor villager's family] received enough gifts of paddy
and rice to feed them for perhaps three months.
At the end of
Ramadan it is the duty of each Moslem to make a religious gift of
rice, called fitrah.
In addition to the customary gifts to the
mosque, the iman, and the village prayer house, rice is often
given, one gallon at a time, to poor relatives and neighbors,
particularly those who have worked for the farmer making the gift.
Razak was given nearly tens gallons of rice as fitrah...and smaller
gifts on the second major Islamic feast day a month later. [On the
third occasion for religious gifts] Razak received a gunny sack of
paddy from his eldest brother... and four or five gallons from the
village....
See Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985), pp. 1-13, 86-91.
^In The Moral Economy of the Peasant. Weapons of the Weak and
Me Llamo Riaoberta Menchti v asl me nacio la conciencia. James Scott
and Rigoberta Menchu detail the vulnerable and erratic lifestyle
found in subsistence-farming communities. The authors demonstrate
not only the rarity of surplus for the subsistence farmer, but also
the infrequency of a peasant family to even have enough to feed
themselves and/or carry out their cultural
or religious
obligations.
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local organizations.47
Moral economists believe that stable social
relationships are necessary for maintaining village
security, giving each individual a stake in protecting the
community as a whole and forcing him or her to internalize
the need for social stability.

This internalization,

manifests itself in peasants' deliberate efforts to adhere
to the traditional roles that have historically provided
them with security.

The economic goal of the peasant

household is to provide itself with sustenance and to
fulfill necessary social, religious and moral obligations.
These goals lead moral economists to insist that peasants'
needs are defined by their culture.

In other words, the

peasant's production must account for cultural as well as
physiological needs.
Because social stability performs an important function
within peasant communities, social unity is crucial to
peasant villages.

Systematic participation in village

activities helps promote collective interests and distinct
village identity.

Moral economists claim that this solid

communal identity helps to foster collective, consensual
decision-making, control internal conflicts and preclude the
individualistic focus on material gain that is fostered and
even encouraged within capitalist societies.
Though many of the tenets of moral economy appear to

47Wolf, Peasants. pp. 44-55.
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romanticize peasant behavior,48 proponents of the doctrine
generally acknowledge that mistrust, antipathy and
individual frictions indeed exist within peasant societies.
Notwithstanding the conflict existing within the
communities, moral economists assert that the village
institutions and organizations assist in surmounting these
conflicts and enable the communities to provide minimal
subsistence and welfare for all their members.

Calhoun

observes: "[Blinding relationships may be full of conflict.
As the Arab proverb has it, 'I against my brothers; I and my
brothers against my cousins; I, my brothers and my cousins
against the world.'"

Moral economists recognize that

communal solidarity does not necessarily indicate a high
level of communal harmony.

While the two entities are

surely related, they can also exist in isolation from one
another.49
B. Popkin's Answer to Moral Economy
Like other critics of James Scott and the moral economy
view,50 Samuel Popkin criticizes the moral economy analysis

48For example, Popkin argues against the notion that patronclient associations among peasants are comparable to extended
family relationships. Popkin believes patron-client relations are
strictly business ventures organized so that each party benefits
from participating in the contract.
49Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition," p. 145.
50For example, see William J. Booth, "A Note on the Idea of the
Moral Economy," American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 4
(December, 1993): 949-54.
Or: Philip G. Roeder, "Legitimacy and
Peasant Revolution: An Alternative to Moral Economy," Peasant
Studies Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring 1984): 149-66.
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of peasant societies for being overly confident in the
virtue of traditional communities and their members.
Contrary to Scott's arguments, Samuel Popkin believes the
majority of moral economy's central claims are unsupported
and unexamined.51 He has developed in contrast a "political
economy" view of peasants' individual and collective
decision-making processes, which he claims is a more
accurate account of peasant behavior and institutions.
Despite Popkin's unyielding objection to the basic premises
of moral economy, there are a few components of the view
which he does find compelling.

For example, political and

moral economists agree that peasants are controlled by the
constant threat and fear of falling below subsistence level
and jeopardizing their personal and familial safety.

To

summarize Popkin's view, I detail his primary opposition and
response to moral economy and then review the subsidiary
components of his argument.

Through the careful breakdown

of political economy, the reader will see that Popkin's view
remains limited by its incapacity to reckon with the
behaviors and ideas examined in the previous chapter.
The first and primary conflict between moral and
political economy arises over diverging concepts of the
production, consumption and exchange of material goods

51For example, Popkin argues against moral economy's treatment
of investments and gambles made by peasants, community "norms," the
free-rider problem within peasant communities, patron-client
relations and peasant goals and rationality. These topics will be
addressed in detail later in this paper.
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within peasant societies.

Popkin disagrees with what he

terms moral economy's "idealistic" notion of peasant
motivation for communal rather than individual gain.

That

is, unlike moral economists, Popkin believes that peasants
seek not only to maintain their current living standards but
also to raise their subsistence levels through both shortand long-term investments and gambles.

He asserts (in

contrast with the information which Rigoberta Menchu has
contributed to the investigation) that peasants rely on
family investments to provide long-term security (having
many children, for example) and village-wide initiatives or
communal investments to provide shorter-term gains.52
Assuming many of these investments are unpredictable, Popkin
believes moral economy's "safety first" assumptions about
subsistence floors are often misleading and at times,
entirely wrong.53

52For example, the peasant couple will have many children to
insure that someone will provide for them and care for their land
when they are too old to do it themselves.
In the short term,
peasants may contribute to village food cooperatives to insure
themselves against failed or ruined crops during a particularly
risky (hot, rainy, cold) season.
53For example, according to James C. Scott, the "safety first"
principle holds that peasants will overlook opportunities to
increase their earnings dramatically through risky investments by
instead seeking to maintain their current (often minimal) earnings
in a risk-free manner.
For example, a peasant farmer prefers to
grow a cheap, easily grown and edible crop (like rice) over a more
lucrative but unreliable crop such as tobacco or rubber.
The
former is very likely to grow at least enough rice to sustain the
family until the next season, even if not enough remains to be
marketed. On the other hand, although a good tobacco crop would be
quite lucrative, a failed tobacco crop is likely to mean
insufficient amounts of food and money to last until the following
season.
For a more detailed discussion of this principle, see

37

Specifically, Popkin disagrees with moral economy's
notion that peasant villages propagate the "safety first"
system through community-wide security measures that value
community welfare over individual welfare.

Popkin rejects

moral economy's assumption that villages function to provide
"safety first" for their members.

He terms this belief "a

direct leap from common interest to collective outcome,"54
and contends that collective rationality within peasant
communities is only a fallacy of moral economy.55 In other
words, Popkin rejects the notion that peasants seek to
preserve or propagate collective interests and argues
instead, that like those living in capitalist societies,
peasants are primarily interested in protecting their
individual and familial interests.
In Popkin's view, peasants frequently make risky
investments in addition to cautious, risk-free investments
consistent with moral economy.

The peasant is "rational" in

the Downsian sense that he has his own (or his family's)
best interest in mind at all times, and seeks to reap the

Scott's The Moral Economy of the Peasant pp.4-13, 15-26, 29, 35,
197-201.
^Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 38.
55This is one of the main arguments I have with Popkin as I
believe that a sense collective rationality does exist in relation
to culture, as in the discussion of Calhoun's points three and
four. In fact, as we have seen, this collective rationality, or
"collective consciousness" plays an important role in the
mobilization and collective action of peasant communities.
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most profit from the least possible about of work.56
"Moral” behavior for the good of the community, therefore,
is not really perceived as a collective insurance scheme,
but as a way of protecting the individual and his or her
family.

Because the peasant perceives commodities and

wealth as limited resources within the village, all
individual and familial desire for economic advancement is
necessarily a zero-sum game which precipitates intra-village
conflict.

Again, contrary to this argument, Rigoberta

Menchu and others have provided evidence in the earlier
discussion that ubiquitous scarcity can actually encourage
cooperation and socialization to norms of sharing and
general open-handedness within the traditional community.
Popkin rejects moral economy's belief that "better-off"
villagers will come to the aid of their poorer neighbors in
times of economic hardship.

His own analysis of Vietnamese

peasant communities demonstrated that the most destitute
individuals were actually excluded from their villages, even
before they fell to subsistence level.

Popkin found that it

was not community members, but the outsiders (the Viet Minh,
in his case study) who intervened into village relations to
help foster stability and protect the lower economic strata
from expulsion or landlessness by increasing tax revenues or

56Anthony Downs defines a rational actor as "a man who moves
toward his goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses
the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued
output." See: An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper
Collins Publishers, 1957), p. 5.
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forcing villagers to clear soil for the landless.
Popkin concludes from these findings that the moral
economists' "metaphor of corporate village as 'collectivity'
should be replaced by the metaphor of the corporative
village as 'corporation.'"57 In other words, village
membership does not indicate special tax breaks, welfare or
insurance, but merely the license to do business and the
freedom to use the institutions and organizations within the
village and the larger peasant community.

Once again,

Menchti, Carmack, Rafaga and Colburn have demonstrated that
at the very least, Popkin's conclusions here are far from
being universal.

What is "true" for Vietnamese peasants of

the mid-twentieth century is not necessarily true for
peasants living under different circumstances and/or in
different time periods.
Popkin distinguishes between the risk-sharing
mechanisms found within peasant communities which moral
economists frequently lump into one category: "safety-first
measures."

By differentiating between mechanisms to provide

insurance, welfare and subsidies, Popkin points out that all
such policies are usually undermined by common-goods
problems, rampant mistrust and the difficulty of forming any
form of village-wide consensus.

Popkin's analysis of

Vietnamese peasants illustrates that favors of reciprocity
lauded by moral economists as "morality" are limited to

57Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 46.
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economic equals, and that village leaders only help the less
fortunate if aid does not negatively affect their own long
term welfare.

For example, Popkin believes the widely used

scattered-field system is not really a collective strategy
used to protect the community from starvation if floods or
fires should destroy crops, but an individual-level strategy
for avoiding risks.

Popkin claims that the self-interested

motivation behind participation in this type of farming
demonstrates that "village insurance" and "safety-first"
schemes extolled by moral economy as provisions for the
collective good are erroneous.
A further blow to moral economy's vision of peasants'
commitment to village unity and collective welfare is a
constant friction that Popkin observes between individual
and group rationality.

By following individual "safety-

first" measures (like scattered-field farming, Popkin
argues) each farmer (and thus the village as a whole) is
ultimately less productive in the long run than he (it)
would have been if the community had followed an aggregate
safety-first strategy.

That is, while scattered plots

reduce the chance of any one farmer losing his entire crop,
they also reduce the maximum yield per farmer.

Popkin

maintains that village-level insurance schemes would be more
productive and secure than individual-level schemes if and
only if moral economy assumptions concerning peasant
behavior were correct.

In other words, if peasants had the

confidence in the charity of their fellow community members
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that moral economists claim they do, there would be no need
to participate in the scattered field system and produce
below their maximum possible crop yield.

If peasants were

as altruistic as moral economists believe, they would work
on non-scattered fields and have faith that if their crops
were destroyed, the community would provide food and money
for them to manage until the following season.

Popkin

claims that this was clearly not the case in the Vietnamese
peasant communities that he observed.
Contrary to Popkin's findings, however, Menchu's
testimony describes the farming system in her community,
where each family does farm its own plot in addition to
helping maintain a separate, communal plot of land that is
given to community members in times of need, used for
religious ceremonies or divided up among the community as
rare surplus.

A strictly economic sense of individual

rationality cannot account for behaviors and beliefs that
consistently repudiate the notion that '•more” is always
"better."
In contrast to the euphemisms of brotherly love,
morality and equality common to the moral economy view of
peasant behavior, Popkin claims that stratification exists
in pre-capitalist peasant societies.

Evidenced by more

interest in individual than communal security, the divisions
between "rich" and "middle" peasants,58 or poor and landless

58According to Popkin,
farming equipment.

these are peasants owning land and
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peasants exist even within the "primitive" societies which
moral economists tend to label egalitarian.

Popkin claims

that the polarization of wealth within these communities
does not result solely from capitalist intervention and
competition in production for marketing purposes; in his
view, colonialism and capitalism exacerbate but do not
create economic competition and social stratification within
peasant communities.
Popkin's second argument against moral economy's
analysis of peasant societies involves the cultural norms
which moral economists consider paramount to the peasant
community.

Contrary to moral economy, Popkin believes

peasant villages are not predominately "moral” communities
that adhere faithfully to social norms.

He maintains that

peasant villages are social organizations —
those existing in capitalist economies —

not unlike

that are tainted

by self-interest, social ranking disputes, desire to improve
living standards at the expense of others, and the free
rider problem.

Additionally, village leaders and other

"elites" have a "capitalist" interest in securing exclusive
profits rather than providing an egalitarian or "level"
social system.59

59The free-rider phenomenon occurs when an organized group
seeks a collective good that will be enjoyed by all if achieved.
An individual may rationalize that he or she will benefit from the
good even if he or she does not work along with the rest of the
group to attain it. Individuals participating in this type of
behavior were referred to by Mancur Olson as "free-riders" in The
Logic of Collective Action. (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).
For example: Ten co-workers in a real estate firm are told by
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Popkin claims that if moral economy's notion of the
peasant's altruistic motivation were correct, free-riderism
would not exist within peasant communities because it would
be overcome by socialization to communal norms esteeming
volunteerism.60 In contrast to this ideal, however, Popkin
found that the twentieth-century Vietnamese peasantry did
not behave according to this model.

In fact, the lack of

adherence to communal norms in colonial Vietnam provided an
influential and important opportunity for the Viet Minh both
to mobilize peasants into their organization and to divide
them against their fellow countrymen.

In other words, by

helping overcome free-riderism and providing collective
incentives to peasant villages, the Viet Minh were able to
co-opt peasant support.

Popkin adds that the Catholic, Cao

their supervisor that if they improve their collective sales rate
by fifteen percent at the end of the year, they will each receive
twice their usual Christmas bonus. The workers are anxious to earn
the extra money, and in the following two weeks, seven of the ten
already have at least four new sales prospects each.
The other
three workers calculate that even if only ten of the new leads turn
into sales (which is very likely) the group will exceed the fifteen
percent increase needed to earn the extra Christmas bonus.
Assuming the bonus is already a "sure thing" the three workers
slack off on their marketing programs in anticipation of "free
riding" on the success of their seven co-workers whose diligence
and struggle increased the collective sales rate.
60 Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 50.
Michael Taylor has
argued: "It is worth noting that it is not an implication of the
moral economy approach that 'there is a community orientation
whereby the free-rider and leadership problems are easily overcome
by proper socialization to norms." (Popkin, The Rational Peasant,
p. 25.) In fact...some villages can overcome free-rider problems,
not through socialization to norms but through individual
rationality, just because they are strong communities— but this
argument is strangely absent from The Rational Peasant. See: M.
Taylor, "Structure, Culture and Action in the Explanation of Social
Change," Politics and Society Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1989): 155.
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Dai and Hoa Hao religions operated in a similar fashion, but
that the communists were "the only group with the
sophisticated understanding of national and international
politics necessary to begin the task of forging a nation by
incorporating the diverse groups within Vietnam and doing
battle against French colonialism."61
Again in contrast to the Vietnamese case, we have seen
that traditional Mayan Indians in Guatemala do esteem
volunteerism, self-sacrifice and sharing as part of their
religion and culture62.

For these reasons, Guatemalan

governments have had great difficulty using non-violent
means to dissolve Indian communities, recruit them into pro
government political organizations or divide the masses of
peasants against themselves, as was the case in Vietnam.
The fact that some Mayan Indians have left their communities
to pursue more modern lifestyles does not disprove my
argument.

As Menchd affirms, individuals who abandon their

customs or regard them shamefully are those who look
unfavorably upon their own race and seek to distance
themselves from it in favor of assimilation (albeit with
limited possibilities) into ladino culture.

Individuals who

reject their own ethnicity (by refusing to identify
themselves as Indians, for example) and with it, traditional

61Popkin, The Rational Peasant p. 185.
62In the Guatemalan case, overcoming free-rider problems could
result
form
such
socialization
and/or through
individual
rationality, as Michael Taylor has suggested.
See: Taylor,
"Structure, Culture and Action," p. 155.
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culture, lie outside the scope of this argument.
A third difference between Popkin and the moral
economists involves peasant behavior in a revolutionary
context.

Moral economy states that peasants support

revolutionaries only when their subsistence (and therefore
survival) is threatened, whereas Popkin believes that
peasants living in feudal or subsistence conditions will
support revolutionaries even without the inspiration of
dramatic subsistence crises.

He rejects moral economy's

assumption that peasants have fixed views of suitable
income, will not strive to raise their income above that
level and are not interested in new forms of consumption.
In his view, peasant are interested in raising and
diversifying their income and may indeed look to
revolutionaries to give them such opportunities.63
Popkin states that short-term declines in peasant
welfare are neither necessary nor sufficient to precipitate

63This point proves complicated in the context of the
Guatemalan case, because in many respects, both Scott and Popkin
appear partially correct in their analyses.
For example, Menchti
supports Scott's notion that Indians are not interested in new
forms of consumption (e.g., clothes, Coca-Cola, white bread,
mechanical corn grinders and contraceptives.) However, as Popkin
argues, she also confirms that they are interested in improving
standards of living.
(For example, not having to work on fincas,
not having to awaken at three in the morning for work, having
adequate food and shelter and lowering the infant mortality rate,
for starters.) For the purpose of this paper, the crucial point is
that Popkin's assertion that peasant struggles are not to restore
traditional systems (or tradition itself) is not universal.
He
sets the two ideas up as mutually exclusive options, when that is
not necessarily the case. Menchd has illustrated that traditional
communities may desire both to preserve tradition and improve
living conditions.
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peasant uprisings, adding that peasants constantly seek
individual and collective means to improve their situations.
For Popkin, therefore, peasant protests are collective
actions hinging on the abilities of a group or class to
organize themselves to make demands on the ruling class.
These movements, he notes, are a reflection of peasants'
increasing ability to organize and fight for rights and
privileges to which they have historically been denied.64
Unlike the moral economists, Popkin believes peasant
struggles are frequently battles to control markets and
bureaucracies rather than movements to restore the
"traditional” systems that provided past security.
A fourth, closely related argument which Popkin makes
against moral economy involves the land owner-tenant
relationship.

Moral economy commonly compares this

relationship to that between a "patriarch and a distant
relative," which Popkin finds too positive a
characterization for what he considers an often exploitative
and hostile association.

He points to the very existence of

a landless laboring-class within peasant society as evidence
of the critical weakness of moral economy.65 For Popkin, the

^Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 35.
65Popkin is implying moral economy theorizes that landlessness
among peasants will not exist for individuals but only for entire
communities. That is, if an individual within a community lost his
or her parcel of land, the rest of the village would compensate for
the loss by sharing their own property. Popkin does not address
the possibility that entire communities may lose their land, be
forced to separate and attempt to assimilate into new communities
that may already be short on arable land.
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lack of moral solidarity among the peasantry implies that
competition exists among them for land and credit from
patrons.

Popkin maintains that competition and discontent

within peasant communities guarantiees the existence of a
readily available throng of peasant tenants, willing to help
their landlord evict a trouble-making or indebted fellow
resident in return for food, land or money.
Popkin argues that peasants can unite to overthrow
landlords and increase their collective security, but only
by changing modes of production, reorganizing local
institutions to remove monopolies and overcoming the
linguistic barriers that hinder their success at the
marketplace.

The central government, therefore, is not

invariably threatening to the peasantry; on the contrary,
Popkin argues, it can actually be an ally in the process of
economic growth and transformation.66 Consequently, the
commercialization of agriculture and development of strong
central authorities are not consistently detrimental to
peasant welfare even though they may initially shake-up the
basic foundation of peasant society.

Popkin does not

suggest that capitalism and colonialism are compassionate,
but simply that traditional institutions are harsher and
less efficient than moral economists suggest.
In light of these arguments, it is important to recall

^If that transformation, however, is unwanted, as in the
Guatemalan Indian case, then the idea of the government being an
"ally” is nothing less than a misnomer.

48

that in contrast to representatives from the traditional
communities discussed earlier, Popkin does not consider the
preservation of culture or custom as "important to peasant
welfare.”

Only if we exclude this factor from

consideration, therefore, does his conclusion ring true.
That is, the commercialization of agriculture is clearly
detrimental to peasant society if cultivating the land and
growing maize is a crucial aspect of Maya-Quiche religion
and culture.

If nothing else, commercialization interferes

with the goals of preserving traditional practices and
adhering to ancestral religious customs.
Popkin claims that change introduced by colonialism —
especially that involving external relations and authority
penetrating peasant villages —

is a dependent variable that

can be explained by treating economic and political concerns
of peasant villages as independent variables.

He maintains

that the distribution of communal resources and patterns of
self-interest that prevailed in villages before the advent
of colonial rule were key in determining the local response
to external regulations and extractions.

"Economics shapes

village institutions,” but should be understood to indicate
the infrastructure of the economic system —

land titles,

taxes, methods of conflict resolution and security
provisions for people and property, not just land, labor,
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water and capital.67
Contrary to moral economy, Popkin believes that peasant
revolutions and reorganizations in response to outside
intervention do not indicate a breakdown in values, moral
bonds or village unity.

Instead, he considers these actions

as typical results of the colonial influences which
exacerbate existing social stratification by strengthening
the political advantage of the upper classes and thereby
inciting peasant protests that eventually snowball into
support for revolutionary change.

Clearly, the notion of

social stratification within traditional peasant communities
is not universal.

For example, Menchti's testimony

repeatedly affirms the overly nature of her community and
its members.
Class benefits from revolutionary action do not
necessarily mean that there are collective reasons to
participate in the activity because the benefits of
collective action appear only in absence of the free-rider
problem.68 For example, many peasants chose not to
participate collective action in pre-colonial Vietnam; the
free-rider syndrome was rampant.

Instead of working for

67Here, Popkin is arguing that economics shapes village
institutions, meaning organizations, their rules and processes. I
disagree with this concept and contend that if cultural factors are
weighed into the equation, they will displaceeconomics as
the
driving force (or independent variable) in explaining traditional
peasant behavior, both individual and communal.
See: Popkin, The
Rational Peasant, p. 182.
68Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 252.
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communal benefit to further shared interests, Popkin claims
that peasants opt to protect and advance exclusively
individual concerns.69 Like Mancur Olson, Popkin believes
"unless there is a coercion or some other special device to
make individuals act for the common good, rational, selfinterested individuals will not act to achieve their common
or group interest.1,70
Because he believes peasants are primarily interested
in financial gain and improving their living conditions,
Popkin argues that cooperation in peasant society is based
on task-specific incentives rather than feelings of moral
obligation or brotherly love.

He argues that peasants can

organize themselves without the intervention of outsiders,
but that such organization is restricted to cases of exigent
necessity; that is, for security or survival.71
Once again diverging from Popkin's analysis, the
earlier discussion and testimony demonstrates that the
traditional community's ability to organize itself lies
outside political economy's narrow, crisis-situation
boundaries, and in fact, often applies to strictly
ideological matters.

I reiterate my central argument:

6901son, The Logic of Collective Action.
70Ibid.
71Popkin notes, "caution and distrust structures the forms of
cooperation but does not prevent cooperative behavior."
He
describes cooperation among small groups of peasants to stabilize
production and provide insurance and collective goods absolutely
essential to survival, like self-defense and irrigation.
Please
see The Rational Peasant, pp. 96-98.
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Popkin's conclusions from the Vietnamese case-study are
neither universal nor generalizable.

The failure of

Popkin's theory to account for the foretold behaviors
indicates that we must at least consider another
alternative, one that has the capacity to include culture
into the analysis and explanation of rationality.
In sum, then, Popkin's view differs from moral economy
in its emphasis on individual rather than collective
decision-making and strategic rather than norm-based
interaction within the peasantry.

Popkin insists his

position does not necessarily mean peasants are only
concerned with material gain.

Instead, he posits, peasants

evaluate all possible outcomes associated with specific
choices and then measure each potential action according to
a subjective assessment of the probable outcome.

In

economic terms, peasants act according to what they believe
will maximize their expected utility.
The "rationality" Popkin portrays is not intended to
suggest that peasants are only self-interested, because he
claims to believe that at times peasants are concerned about
the welfare of others, though he never details when those
times might be.

Nevertheless, peasants' primary concerns

are with self and immediate family.72 When considering the

72Although
here,
it appears
"immediate
family"
needs
qualification.
If one fails to disregard Popkin's discussion of
frequently-practiced "infanticide," this assertion appears to
conflict with his earlier argument that peasant children are
largely considered expendable commodities that can be replaced when
finances permit.
I assume here he is referring only to "older"

consequences of specific actions with regard to broader
values and objectives,

Popkin concludes that peasants

more likely than not to act in a "rational and
[economically] self-interested" manner.73

children (at least eight years old) spouses and parents.
73Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 31.

Chapter III;
Complementing rationality with culture

A comprehensive examination and explanation of peasant
behavior in collective action deviates from Popkin's view in
two fundamental ways.

First, Popkin insists "rationality"

is a crucial factor in explaining peasant behavior.
with him on this point.

I agree

However, in contrast to Popkin's

argument, I claim that rationality is neither static nor
monomorphic, but determined — at least in part—

by

sociocultural forces functioning within a given community.
If we are to judge, cross-culturally, the "rationality" of
conduct or beliefs without tainting our analysis with
Western prejudice, we must account for specific influences
upon the formation of those behaviors and ideas.

"By

abstracting human beings from their social/historical
condition in order to develop an account of pure rational
action, the analysis implicitly takes the position that the
structural conditions for the translation of rationality
into action are of theoretically secondary interest to the
problem of characterizing traditional action itself."74 In
74Levine and Wright, "Rationality and Class Struggle," New Left
Review 123 (1980): 60. While Popkin does not "abstract" Vietnamese
peasants from their conditions, neither does he include particular
cultural factors into his analysis of rationality. He treats the
53
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other words, "pure” rationality cannot exist if we are to
develop a model of rational behavior with the capacity for
transcultural and global utility.
In many Latin American peasant societies traditional
cultural factors help determine what constitutes "rational”
or "irrational" behavior.

As Craig Calhoun asserts:

"Choices are still to be made, but they must take social
relationships very closely into account."75 That is, while
traditional culture does not predetermine peasant behavior,
it is, as we have seen, an influential and constraining
influence on individual and group activity.

Levine and

Wright argue:
Human beings may be generally rational...and yet
may be generally thwarted from fully acting on the
basis of that rationality because of social
constraints, relations of domination,
organizational incapacities for collective
struggle and so on. The abstracted, ahistorical
account of rationality may provide an essential
element in the philosophical critique of those
constraints, but it does not provide a basis for
explaining the real determinations and
contradictions of those constraints.76
Second, in response to the moral economy view of
peasant culture, which claims that peasants defend

Vietnamese peasant as a generic "person type" whose behavior (or
rationality) is duplicated in other, different circumstances. It
is this universalization of peasant motivation and behavior to
which I am reacting. When considering peasant rationality, we must
account for specific social and historical factors in order to
avoid the pitfall of unjustified cultural universalism.
75Calhoun, "Radicalism of Tradition," p. 147.
76Levine and Wright, "Rationality and Class Struggle," p. 60.
(My emphasis.)
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traditional institutions because they provide reliable means
of subsistence, Popkin contends that peasants are constantly
looking to improve their standards of living, often at the
expense of fellow community members.

He does not consider

the possibility that a peasant community may cling to
traditional institutions for the sake of tradition itself,
as a means to protect and preserve its imperiled culture and
autonomy.

Preserving cultural traditions is synonymous with

survival; theoretically, if the community's distinctive
culture, traditions and institutions disappear, Menchu's
people cease to exist.

In other words, life without

cultural identity is death.

While rationality is indeed

individually determined, that rational behavior can be
employed to obtain and protect collective objectives that
cannot be reduced to individually beneficial economic
interests.
This paper has examined collective consciousness and
individual sacrifice for the sake of community within two
Central American peasant societies —

the Mayan Indians

living in the Altiplano of Guatemala and the Miskito Indians
on the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast.

I believe that these

cases are not "exceptions to the rule" of self-interested
rational behavior —
believe —

as Popkin would likely encourage us to

but indications of an intrinsic sense of

community and collective interest that is irreducible to the
individual level.

In other words, as Menchu has informed

us, individual rationality is at times not exercised for
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individual benefit (indeed, it can be contrary to individual
interest) but to safeguard a deeply personalized collective
identity.

A Miskito patriot explains:

In the Indian villages on the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua we have our own way of living. We like
to live in freedom. The people of Awastara, the
village where I was born, like to live and think
independently. Since the ancient days, we Miskito
Indians have possessed great strength and wisdom,
which have served to preserve and protect our
traditions, our lives and our dignity as a
nation.... Our spiritual family embraces all
Indians who have tread upon this earth and all who
will make life's journey in a future time.... Now
in the year 1987, I, Rafaga, am demanding the
restoration of our Miskito Indian rights. The
voices of all my ancestors and the voices of all
future generations of Miskito come now to mingle
with my own as our words ride together on a gust
of wind...exploding of fiery evidence into the
ears of our world.
Likewise, in her personal testimony, Menchu tells of
several occasions of non self-interested behavior which
could not be explained by Popkin's account of economic
rationality.

For example, she describes the birth custom

within the community:
The birth of a new member is very significant for
the community, as it belongs to the community not
just to the parents, and that's why three
couples...must be there to receive it....[After
the birth] the community takes over all the
household expenses for...eight days and the family
spends nothing
The tying of hands at birth
symbolizes...that no one should accumulate things
that the rest of the community does not have and
he must know how to share, to have open hands.78

^Reynaldo Reyes and J.K. Wilson, Rafaga. the Life Storv of a
Nicaraguan Miskito Comandante (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1992), p. 3.
78Menchd, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, pp. 11, 13, 15.

Here, both the actions of the community (giving money) and
the symbolism of the custom (tying of hands) give credence
to the central claim of this argument: the existence of
norm-enforced, non self-interested behavior.
Another illustration of non self-interested behavior
within the Maya-Quiche community unfolds in Menchu's
description of her childhood work life.

One particular

season, while living on a landowner's farm with her family
MenchO's younger brother, Nicholas, starved to death.

The

ladino landowner forced them to leave without compensation
because they had missed a day's work to bury the child.
Menchd recounts the situation:
We didn't know our whereabouts, we didn't know
where we were or anything.
My mother didn't even
know the name of the town we were in. But we knew
we had to leave so my mother began getting our
things together. So our neighbors said: 'We'll go
with you even though it means losing everything we
worked for too.' One of them lent my mother some
money to pay for the burial since she'd been at
the finca about for four months and had saved a
little money....We arrived back at our house in
the AZtiplano....My father didn't know his son had
died, nor did my other brothers and sisters
because they were working on other fincas.
Fifteen days later, they all arrived home to be
greeted by the news that the little boy had died
and that we owed a lot of money. My father and
brothers and sisters had been earning in other
fincas and had enough money to settle with our
neighbor. The neighbor also gave what he felt he
should to the dead child. That's how they helped
us— the community, everyone— once we'd got home.79
Both the Miskito and Maya-Quiche cases reveal that part of
the collective identity which both communities strive to

79Ibid, pp. 40-41.
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protect includes a shrinking cultural base, endangered
subsistence and a disappearing way of life.

These peoples

are literally in danger of extinction due to both atrocious
living conditions, like the malnutrition Menchti. mentions
repeatedly in her narration, and organized campaigns to
assimilate, integrate or destroy the indigenous populations.
Recall the suggestion of Ian Lustik with which I began
this essay: there is "a pre-existing sense of community
among participants in collective revolutionary action that
makes it possible for organizers to appeal the rationality
of their constituents as basis for participation.”80 In the
context of this paper, I maintain that (1) common culture
and (2) collective consciousness are independent variables
leading to the dependent variable (3) facilitated collective
action.

While I seek not to "prove” Calhoun's thesis

concerning mobilization, I do believe that common cultural
and traditional constraints combine with

a collective

consciousness that transcends individual economic interests
combine to give these peasant groups the "pre-existing sense
of community" to which Lustik refers.

I do not believe this

deduction is unconditionally true, but hinges on specific
cultural and traditional influences functioning within the
given community.

That is, as Levine and Wright have

indicated, rational behavior cannot be understood or
explained in abstraction from its context, but only by

80Lustik, "Writing the Intifada," p. 589.
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taking social, historical and cultural factors into account.
Craig Calhoun's explanation of peasant rationality and
mobilization has provided four specific, yet generalizable
factors to explain why traditional communities are mobilized
into collective action more readily than non-traditional
communities.

Expanding upon these points without diving

into the empirical problem of confirming his thesis, I
conclude that: (1) specific cultural forces and (2) a sense
of collective identity or group consciousness were (and are)
at work in facilitating Mayan and Miskito mobilization into
rebellious and even revolutionary activity.
Calhoun sets out the following definition of a
traditional community:
Community is...a central medium for transmitting
tradition and a large part of what tradition is
about...a complex variable measuring the extent to
which people are knit together by direct social
relationships81.... [Relationships may be
stronger or weaker, networks may be knit more or
less densely and systematically together, and a
population may be more or less able to run its own
affairs without outside intervention. Community
constrains the range of free choice of individuals
by committing them to specific, long-term
relationships. Such communities make it possible
for members to act with considerable certainty as
to what their fellows will do.... [Bjecause their
activity is kept largely within the grounds of
established relationships, members of communities
are able constantly to reproduce a traditional

81Calhoun adds that these relationships include both intimate
and "secondary" associations.
"They do not include those
constructed through the mediation of bureaucracy or those
transcending communications technology. Relationships which lack
personal recognition and face-to-face constitution [are indirect.]"
Please see Calhoun, "New Information Technology, Large Scale Social
Integration and the Local Community," Urban Affairs Quarterly 22
(1986) pp. 329-49.
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culture without introducing a wide variety of
interpretation.82
Thus, because they engender a collective identity (or
collective consciousness, as I have tried to illustrate)
traditional communities such as the Mayan and Miskito
Indians engender collective, often non-economic interests
which cannot be fulfilled at an individual level.

For

example, in accordance with the testimony of Menchti, the
Mayan Indians living throughout Guatemala and Chiapas,
Mexico have fought for the past several decades for their
cultural rights.

Regardless of what that term boils down

to, it follows that these "cultural rights" are sought for
an entire group rather than any one individual.
individual can protect, preserve —
propagate —

No

and certainly not

an entire culture by working independently.

Conceivably, most organized groups are composed of
individuals who share at least one, and often many common
interests.

Unlike such "interest groups" (political

parties, unions, university student bodies) whose members
often have differing social backgrounds and different
paramount goals, the traditional community can benefit from
members' prior associations or bonds as components of one
socioeconomic, political, linguistic and cultural body.

Not

only do they share a common culture, but a common autonomous
culture that is not and cannot be duplicated outside of its

82Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition," pp. 148-49.
Idem. , "Community: Toward a Variable Conceptualization for
Comparative Research," Social History 5 (1980) pp. 105-129.
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existing social boundaries.

Conclusion

By considering the Mayan and Miskito Indians of Central
America, I have illustrated that Samuel Popkin's argument
for "political economy" in The Rational Peasant is flawed by
its failure to consider culture in the study and theorizing
of rational behavior.

In criticizing the overly optimistic

view of moral economists advanced in James C. Scott's The
Moral Economy of the Peasant. Popkin appears to overstate
his case in favor of an economically oriented peasantry
which relies little (or not at all) on its communal
traditions, norms or culture as bases for decision-making or
determining rational behavior.

By omitting these crucial

factors and taking no account of specific cultural forces
(or even general ones, for that matter) functioning within a
given peasant community, Popkin implicitly embraces a
cultural universalism that is clearly unsuitable for
examining the Indian communities I have addressed in this
paper.
An inquiry into the beliefs, actions and attitudes of
Maya-Quiche and Miskito Indians indicates that Popkin's
political economy falls short of providing an appropriate
analytical framework for understanding these peoples.
Scott's moral economy, in fact, appears a great deal more
62
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appropriate.

It seems clear that political and moral

economy are not necessarily mutually exclusive schools of
thought, but instead, can be complements in the task of
explaining peasant behavior.
other —

Pitting one school against the

or rationality against tradition —

does little to

advance our appreciation and understanding of peoples unlike
ourselves.

Michael Taylor explains:

From reading Samuel Popkin's attack in The
Rational Peasant on Scott/s Moral Economy of the
Peasant, one might come away believing (as Popkin
seems to believe) that these two approaches are
incompatible with each other, that a peasant with
a "moral economy" could not also be a rational
peasant. This would be mistaken. There is in
fact nothing in Scott's arguments that cannot be
integrated into [anl... explanatory framework [of
rational behavior.]®3
As mentioned in the outset of this investigation, however,
merely converging moral and political economy is not
sufficient.

The evidence examined in this essay

substantiates the claim that we also must contemplate the
third, "culturally inclusive" alternative which I have
advanced.

Omitting culture from considerations of rational

behavior provides tacit support for cultural universalism.
Such an exclusion must be avoided if we are to develop non
biased theories of rational choice.
To recapitulate the argument, I claim the following:
Here is this evidence (Menchti's testimony et. al.): If it is
valid —

a question beyond the scope of this paper —

existing moral and political economy frameworks cannot

83Taylor, "Structure, Culture and Action," pp. 118-19.

than
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handle it.

Therefore, we must also consider alternative

approaches to rationality which can account for culture, and
test them empirically in further investigation.
While the task of reconciling culture with the concept
of rationality is fundamentally more complicated than
Popkin's strictly economic analysis, is not theoretically
impossible.

Reiterating Levine and Wright, we need simply

to consider rationality as "endogenous" to a given
sociocultural system.

The most "narrow” conclusion, then,

is that a culturally aware inquiry into peasant behaviors
can ultimately be advantageous to many disciplines of social
science, beginning with anthropology, sociology and
political science.

In a more cosmopolitan sense, we human

beings could do worse than to strive for cultural
sensitivity and reciprocal understanding on the evershrinking planet which we all call home.
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